Lina Andersson

About me

I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at Gothenburg University. I am on the job market fall 2021.

My research spans behavioral economics, game theory, and economic theory. I am particularly interested in the strategic role of emotions. In my dissertation I develop a game theoretic framework in which players can transition between emotional states of mind. The emotional state of mind determines the players' utility function. In this framework, players rationally anticipates how own and others' state of mind determines their utility function. In my applications I consider three emotional states of mind: fear, friendliness, and hostility. My current work in progress includes experimental designs to test hypotheses from the chapters in my dissertation.

Please find my CV here.

Research

Publications

• "Cooperation Between emotional Players", Games 2020, 11, 45.

  Abstract: This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player’s psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player’s utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players’ material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished

Working papers

• "Fear and Economic Behavior" Job Market Paper, available here

  Abstract: I model strategic interactions between players who can be in either a neutral or a fearful state of mind. The state of mind influences the players' utility functions. My two main assumptions are (i) a fearful player is more concerned with risk and (ii) fear is triggered after a sufficient increase in a player's expected cost of negative outcomes. I normalize the payoffs such that outcomes bad enough to, potentially, trigger a fear response when anticipated have a negative payoff. A player's initial belief over the expected cost of negative outcomes determines the player's transitions between the states of mind, and I use psychological game theory in the analysis of my applications. I demonstrate the consequences of fear in three applications: robberies, bank runs, and public health interventions.

• "Seller Reputation and Buyer Information Sharing"

  Abstract: I study a simple model of an interaction between a seller and two buyers. The seller decides on a price (high or low) for two identical products. The seller privately knows the quality of the product (high or low). The buyers decide whether to buy one unit of the product at the posted price. If buyer 1 buys the product, then he or she can write a review. The review, which is costly in terms of time and money, is observed by buyer 2 before his or her purchasing decision. The interaction between the seller and each buyer is a one-shot interaction. A buyer who only cares for own material payoff has no incentive to write a review. However, I assume that buyer 1 may be emotional. An emotional buyer can transition between two emotional states of mind: a neutral and a hostile. In the neutral state of mind, the buyer only cares for own material payoff. In the hostile state of mind, the buyer cares for own material payoff but also cares negatively for the seller's profits. A hostile buyer may have an incentive to write a review if the review can harm the seller financially. The presence of emotional buyers increases buyers' surplus. When the presence of emotional buyers leads to an increase in the probability of trade, it can also increase seller's profits.

Work in progress

• ”Cognitive Dissonance: Theory and evidence from the Covid-19 pandemic”
• “Fear: What can it tell us about bank runs?”
• “Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Do emotions favor commonly played strategy profiles?”

Teaching

Teaching assistant:

• Mathematics
  Undergraduate level. Spring and fall 2018, spring 2019, fall 2020.

• Microeconomic Theory
  Undergraduate level. Fall 2019.

• Microeconomic Theory
  Graduate level. Fall 2019.

• Statistics
  Undergraduate level. Spring 2018 and 2019.

• Macroeconomic Theory
  Undergraduate level. Fall 2020.

• Applied Economics
  Undergraduate level. Fall 2020.